European electricity industry has recently come through liberalization. Surge of intakes with high share of cross-border deals was market players' response. Measuring of post-merger performance alterations is a central question of M&A literature. EU energy sector is responsible for significant part of global greenhouse gas emissions. Its efficiency should be regarded with respect to ecological dimension. This study addresses combined economic and environmental performance of 15 biggest European energy producers in 2005-2013.
Introduction
Numerous waves of mergers and acquisitions were observed all over the World in many industries. Vast and diverse literature analyses their outcomes. Present study continues this strand by addressing causal relationship between M&As and post-merger performance of European electricity producers. The energy sector is chosen due to three reasons. First, it is strongly involved in processes of mergers and acquisitions. Its share in global amount of takeovers was 6.3% in 2001 (Pryor, 2001 ).
In 2010 sector of power generation took second place by number of deals (Schmid et al., 2012) . Second, electricity is essential for functioning of quasi-totality of manufacturing and service activities.
Understanding such crucial sectors' performance would contribute to knowledge on industrial organization in whole. Finally, electricity as a good is homogenous. This property eases monitoring and ensures comparability of multinationals.
This research is focused on third, after Asia and North America, most important market of elec- However, it is of interest to briefly characterize main stages of EU energy market's evolution. During 1990s the competition on European energy market was notable restricted due to numerous state interventions. In most EU members installed generation capacities have been overlapping actual needs of the sector. Furthermore, states were forcing the use of exclusively internal resources, instead of low-cost alternatives. Such policy limited the diversification of fuel sources. Consequently, firms had no incentives towards efficiency. They tended to rely on long-term forecasting, which reduced overall operational flexibility (Serrallés, 2006) . EU energy market's liberalization was initialized by intra-national greenfield investments. In order to survive consequent intense competition, energy firms massively adopted the strategy of M&As Fraunhoffer et al. (2013) . According to the report of CERNA (Codognet et al., 2002) , 96 merg-ers and acquisitions were completed from 1998 to 2002 . Haas et al. (2006 identified the stage of vertical re-integration that followed initial "value-chain disintegration". Indeed, intakes contributed to substantial broadening of distribution networks, which motived transformation of market structure. Incumbents employed M&As to limit the risk of market share's loss and survive turbulent post-deregulation period.
Despite ongoing intense merger activity and improvements of legislation, by 2006 EU energy market was divided into seven disconnected parts. European Commission (2007) observed multiple market imperfections. They revealed high concentration, vertical foreclosure, insufficient market integration and balancing markets, lack of transparency, inefficient price formation. European energy firms were heterogeneous in terms of market shares and production costs. An important particularity of power market is that its structure is indirectly influenced by environmental issues. The need to account for ecological impact of production triggers constant technological developments in the industry (Domanico, 2007) . Sector of electricity and heat in 2011 was responsible for 42% of global CO2 emissions. Despite much effort dedicated to the switch to green energy, in 2010-2011 emissions of that industry increased by 4.4% faster than total emissions (International Energy Agency, 2013).
According to European Environment Agency (2014), around 26.2% of total greenhouse gasses in EU15 countries are emitted by the sector of public electricity and heat production. Corresponding share in EU28 is 28.9%, which is below worldwide level. Absolute amount of EU power sector's emissions has been smoothly decreasing overtime. In EU15 897.9 MT of CO2 equivalent were produced in 2012, which is by 6.1% less comparing to the level of 1990 (956 MT). Therefore, European power industry doesn't fit the global pattern. upon existing literature on power mergers is twofold. First, most of previous studies were focused exclusively on U.S. market. Second, it is the second study (after Berry, 2000) accounting for crossborder dimension of energy deals. It is worth noting that later stages of common market's creation were mainly driven by international mergers. Therefore, such insights are of particular importance for European power industry.
On the other hand, I contribute to general debate on post-merger performance alteration. Employed comprehensive two-stage approach brings this research to border line of M&A literature.
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) has already become a common technique applied to mergers in banking and assurance. I fit the minor segment of studies employing such approach to non-financial industries. Furthermore, exploited output-oriented DEA model takes into account ecological aspect of electricity production. Carbon-dioxide (CO2) emissions are introduced as an undesirable outcome. Second-stage fractional regression analysis addresses financial determinants of firm-level performance. Therefore, I consider both economic and environmental dimensions of M&As outcomes, which is an advance comparing to previous studies.
This research employs the sample consisting of 15 biggest EU energy multinationals. In 2013 their share in total European electricity production was 62.3%. During the period of interest they completed 165 deals, of which 98 cross-border ones. For the sake of simplicity in following discussion acquiring firms are called as "buyers". Energy utilities that sell their branches or producing units are further referred as "sellers". It is worth noting that present research investigates outcomes of M&As for sellers and buyers, but not for targets. Later ones are excluded from the analysis due to unavailability of the data on small-sized market players.
Results suggest that energy producers profit from short-run increase in their performance after international sell-off. This effect is not significant in long-run. If energy producers sell their subsidiaries to domestic rivals, they immediately lose in efficiency. However, domestic sell-offs are beneficial in long term due to achievement of more efficient allocation of production capacities. Both domestic and cross-border acquisitions are detrimental in short run. Acquirers need to deal with incoming 4 inefficiency bring by recently bought inefficient entities ("lemons"). Cross-border intakes increase efficiency one and two years after their completion. "Lemons" evolve to over-performing "cherries".
However, this doesn't work for domestic acquisitions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In (Section 2 I summarize existing studies on postmerger performance outcomes in electricity sector. Their results are compared to general M&A literature. I underline specificities of cross-border deals. The literature review is continued with the survey of studies on the causal relationship between M&As and firm-level performance of energy utilities. It allows to place present research among closely related narrow literature. I present in Section 3 construction of dataset and sources. The research strategy is described in Section 4. First, I briefly explain application of output-oriented Data envelopment analysis. Discussion of secondstage empirical strategy follows. Results are reported and discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes this research.
Literature review
Broad and heterogeneous literature on outcomes of mergers and acquisitions has been developed since 1980s. Firm-level performance changes have been systematically proxied by alterations in wealth of shareholders. General cross-industry empirical results suggest that targets gain after the merger (e.g. Asquith and Kim, 1982; Andrade et al., 2001; Bruner, 2004; Corrado, 2011) . However, the outcomes in terms of an acquirer's shareholder wealth are at best not significant (e.g. Asquith, 1983; Agrawal et al., 1992; Loderer and Martin, 1992) , but often negative (e.g. Moeller et al., 2004; King et al., 2004) Cross-border mergers and acquisitions are an important instrument for international diversification (Shimizu et al., 2004) . Nocke and Yeaple (2007) developed a general equilibrium framework where firms choose between exporting, greenfield FDI and cross-border M&As. They argued that mergers and acquisitions are caused by the heterogeneity in firms' intangible assets or «capabilities».
Cross-border M&As are motivated by complementarities between internationally mobile and nonmobile capabilities. Therefore, deals of this type provide access to country-specific capabilities of target firm, which could induce positive returns.
International mergers could be beneficial for merging firms due to several reasons. Cross-border deals allow exploiting differences in tax systems and absorbing rents from market inefficiencies (Servaes and Zenner, 1994) . Spillovers of corporate governance standards could improve corporate governance (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) . Shimizu et al. (2004) found that national cultural differences and organizational learning induce post-merger value creation. (Kiymaz and Mukherjee, 2000) argued that an acquirer is more able to make use of its strategic advantages during the interna-5 tional acquisition. Targets could benefit due to optimization of their business processes under foreign control and gaining access to cheaper external resources.
Early empirical studies on outcomes of cross-border deals contradict to general M&A literature.
They revealed that bidders gain in shareholder value (e.g. Kang, 1993; Morck and Yeung, 1992; Markides and Ittner, 1994; Cakici et al., 1996) . The results for energy utilities are in line with findings for other industries. Bartunek et al. (1993) and Ray and Thompson (1990) They found returns for target firms to be positive and statistically significant. Meanwhile, shortrun outcomes for bidder's wealth are estimated to be more negative, comparing to results for nonregulated industries. Leggio and Lien (2000) pointed to features of the regulation of US utility sectors, which is based on the rate of return. Indeed, the authorities could subtract the part of acquirer's gain. Therefore, potential benefits for acquirer's shareholders could be reallocated to consumers.
Leggio and Lien (2000) also argued that combined firm's shareholders' value is reduced in case of 6 diversifying mergers. There is only one, to my knowledge, study that aims to differentiate the impact of cross-border and domestic deals in the energy sector. Berry (2000) applied standard event methodology to the sample of 21 mergers involving U.S. bidders. He revealed that target's shareholder value increases in any case. Post-merger evolution of acquirer's shareholder value differs for national and cross-border intakes. US energy utilities experienced decrease in their shareholder value if they were acquiring domestically. They are more familiar with national market and legislation, comparing to the firms that acquire foreign targets. Therefore, domestic bidders are more are more prone to pay nominated in shareholder value deal's premium.
Most part of studies on M&As in energy industry explain variation in shareholder value. BeckerBlease et al. (2008) is a study that belongs to narrow branch treating performance outcomes. Theyexamined post-merger changes in return on assets, sales to total employees, asset turnover and expense ratio, as well as stock prices of U.S. electric utilities. They concluded that merged energy companies performed no better or worse than the ones not involved in M&A activity. They interpreted such result in a way that expected synergetic efficiency gains are absorbed by other industry stakeholders. They found that integration with gas activities or diversification into new geographic areas are detrimental for both market and operating performances. Data on mergers and acquisitions is extracted from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum. 3 In order to be included in the present analysis, deals must simultaneously fit following conditions. First, the deal must be fully completed between years 2004 and 2013. Second, the initial acquirer's stake of shares must be below 50%, whereas it must possess 50% or more after the completion of the deal.
Third, M&As are limited to ones involving targets operating in closely related to energy production sectors. Details on targets' primary sectors are reported in Table 1 . Sources of data and definitions are summarized in Table 4 . Section 7 is dedicated to descriptive statistics. Some parameters of distributions of DEA components and control variables are in Table A1 . 
Research strategy
This research employs two-stage Data envelopment analysis (DEA). It is a nonparametric technique that employs observed inputs and outputs of decision making units (DMU) (Charnes et al., 1978) .
Present research is based on 2-by-2 input-output matrix. Total operating expenditures and installed production capacities are taken as inputs. Physical amounts of generated energy are regarded as target output. Carbon dioxide emissions are undesirable production output. I calculate emissions as amounts of CO2 per MWh produced. Relative nature of this measure allows bypassing inseparability of emissions from production. Absolute level of CO2 increases with bigger quantities produced.
Meanwhile, carbon factor depends also on the share of clean capacities in use.
I exploit undesirable measure model following Seiford and Zhu (2002) . More precisely, the model is output-oriented. DMUs stick to given amounts of inputs and maximize desirable output with simultaneous minimization of undesirable one. Each firm repeats this optimization program each year.
Basing on decisions of all utilities during the entire period (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) , I construct best-practice frontier. Such approach is equivalent to window analysis (Charnes et al., 1994) with the width of window equal to 9 years. This means that the technological frontier doesn't vary over period of interest. It is a realistic assumption because the usual lifetime of an energy producing plant exceeds by much 9 year-term. Indeed, there were no drastic technological changes since almost all plants operating in 2005 were kept until 2013.
Relative performance score is assigned to each firm according to its distance from efficiency frontier. Its values belong to (0;1]. A firm has the unity score in a given year if in this year it is most efficient comparing to all other utilities over 9-year period. Values below 1 indicate utility's inefficiency in a given year.
Data envelopment analysis is a frequently applied mathematical method of an industry's performance assessment. This research exploits two-stage DEA approach, which allows to reveal causal influence of firm-specific factors on performance. (Yang and Pollitt, 2009 ) revealed a number of advantages of this method. First, it doesn't require strong prior judgment on the direction of independent variables' influence on performance. Second, both categorical and continuous variables could be included without the need to increase the sample size. Finally, it is relatively easy to apply and interpret, comparing to three or four-stage models.
However, DEA approach has two potential weaknesses, which are considered in present research.
First, the impact of independent variables may be biased if fist-stage variables are highly correlated with second-stage controls. Therefore, I account for correlation between employed variables. Second, calculated at first stage relative performance scores lie in the interval of (0; Two alternative link functions, namely logit and probit, are used separately. It is worth noting that the logit link function is most frequently applied in the context of fractional response variables.
All estimated regression models could be represented in following general form:
Coefficients of interests are α k . They correspond to categorical dummies, so that different types of M&A activities are distinguished. I report exact definitions of categories in Table 2 below. Impact of each of them is tested separately. All specifications include the same set of control variables.
Firms that recently came through another merger could be better able to adjust their structure and management in post-merger period. For example, they could quicker adapt their production in accordance with new fuel mix. One could call this as merger experience. I control for it with TwoMergers dummy, which takes the unity value if firm was engaged in any M&As during two consecutive years.
Cross-border merger experience should be different from domestic one. Energy utilities face the need to integrate entities that are functioning in another regulatory environment and under different macroeconomic conditions. An energy utility, which has already engaged human and financial resources in cross-border re-adjustments, is expected to be more vulnerable facing another merger the next year. I introduce TwoCBMergers that takes the unity value if the utility underwent international mergers both this year and one year ago.
Kwoka and Pollitt (2010) revealed large cost savings due to coordination between energy generation and distribution. Kwoka and Pollitt (2010) confirmed this result and showed that vertical integration positively influences overall performance of energy utility. I control for vertical integration with GenToSales variable. It is the share of distribution output generated by the utility itself. A firm's performance is largely influenced by its management. Vast literature 4 was devoted to the study of principal-agent problem. Top management (agents) could take decisions that diverge from objectives of principals, but are beneficial for their own wealth. In that case firm could largely underperform. The risk to face principal-agent issue is higher if managers possess corporate shares.
Overcoming of informational asymmetry between involved parties is a potential solution. Physical assets could be relatively easily observed and monitored. Therefore, the more a firm uses hard capital, the less it is exposed to principal-agent issue. I present study I control for capital-to sales ratio (K/S).
It is computed by dividing long term tangible assets (property, plant, and equipment) by net sales.
Therefore, it is a proxy of the vulnerability to principal-agent problem.
Physical capital is the key production factor for the electricity industry. Energy utilities make intensive capital investments in two cases. The first one correspond to the construction of new capacities with large costs of implementation. Alternatively, production capacities could be replaced or renovated in order to fit the ecological norms. Such alterations are expected to largely influence 4 see e.g. seminal paper of Jose et al. (1996) performance of energy utilities. In present research I control for the ratio of capital expenditures to tangible long term assets (I/K) as in Himmelberg et al. (1999) . They argued that firms with higher investment rate have more opportunities to implement discretionary projects and therefore grow faster.
Inelastic nature and seasonality of energy demand are important particularities of electricity market. They provide to wide range of electricity utilities, including small-scaled ones, large opportunities to exploit their market power. Energy firms might use two mechanisms of the control over energy prices (Helman, 2006) . The first one is «physical withholding», which consists in generating quantities of energy below productive capacity. The alternative is to employ «financial withholding» by setting the excessive price. Therefore, the market power is expected to influence firm-level performance, which depends on production capacities in use, as well on generated electricity. In present research I follow Himmelberg et al. (1999) and control for the ratio of operating income to net sales
Leverage is an important measure of financial sustainability. It reflects the extent to which firm's activities are financed by creditor funds. Trade-off theory of optimal capital structure describes the choice of leverage as the equilibrium between benefits and costs of debt (see e.g. Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) ). Performance of low-leveraged firms is a positive function of debt-to-capital ratio due to overcoming of agency problem. The performance of high-leveraged firms deteriorates with more leverage due to two reasons. First, they have fewer incentives to further invest in capital. Second, serving of their debt requires excessive cash flow (Coricelli et al., 2012) . Following the intuition above, the leverage and its square term are controlled for. I apply its most referenced definition, which is the ratio of total liabilities to shareholders' equity. I this study I control for current ratio, that is computed as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Baños-Caballero et al. (2012) found inverted U-shaped relationship between liquidity and profitability of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME).
Aktas et al. (2015) argued that expected relation between working capital and firm performance isnegative at high level of liquidity and positive at its low level. Therefore, in present research current ratio is introduced as right-hand side variable in both linear and quadratic terms.
Functioning of energy utilities is subject of national regulation. Despite much effort dedicated by European Commission, EU members still differ a lot in terms of control over energy production.
A sound example is the nuclear phase-out in Germany. Tax legislation is another source of crosscountry dissimilarities. Therefore, a part of variation in performance of utilities could be attributed to their location. I account for cross-national differences by controlling for production capacities installed in Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Czech Republic and Poland.
I also include variables catching capacities in Benelux and Nordic EU countries. 
Results
At the first stage relative performance scores are calculated basing on DEA output-oriented model with undesirable output. Their values are reported in Table 5 Table A2 . It is worth noting that the absolute value of correlation with DEA components don't exceed 0.55. Therefore, all of controls are appropriate.
Core regression analysis is devoted to estimate Equation (1). First, I address outcome of mergers completed in the year when performance is measured (period t). Meanwhile, delayed-in-time effect of deals is highly probable. Therefore, I separately regress performance scores on lagged with 1 and Table 3 below. Following discussion is based on the concept that targets are typically underperforming firms ("lemons"). 5 Blonigen et al. (2014) showed that targets are bought when their price is relatively low, which takes place after a negative productivity shock. They pointed that in later period "lemons" evolve to well-performing "cherries". Assuming that acquired utilities are "lemons", two simultaneous effects should take place. On the one side, acquirers have to overcome incoming inefficiency in short and medium-term run. On the other side, vendors would be expected to strengthen their efficiency as long as they get rid of non-efficient entities.
A merger in broad sense immediately deteriorates performance of energy utility (Columns 1 and 2 in Table 6 ). Coefficient of interest is significant at 5% level. Negative short-run effect could indicate that the deterioration of acquirer's performance dominates over vendors' efficiency gains. This effect doesn't sustain in one-year term (Columns 3 and 4). Mergers, which were completed two years ago, positively contribute to performance (Columns 5 and 6). Over two-year horizon previously underperforming entities "lemons" turn to be over-performing "cherries".
However, such hypothesis sustains only under assumption that targets systematically underperform prior to merger. Employed dataset doesn't allow computing targets' performance. Therefore, mentioned channel should be seen as only one of plausible explanations. Further in-depth identification is needed to clearly isolate effects. I decompose M&As into cross-border and domestic deals, as well acquisitions and sell-offs.
Both domestic and cross-border deals negatively influence performance in short-run (columns 1-2, in Table 7 ). One should note that domestic mergers are more detrimental. The timing of positive outcome differs. International M&As turn to bring additional performance the year that follows completion of the merger. Domestic deals are efficiency-enhancing in two-year term. However, for further interpretation, acquisitions and sell-offs should be differentiated.
Statistically significant negative effect of undifferentiated acquisitions is observed in short-run (see columns 1-2 in Table 8a ). This effects turns to be positive over two-year horizon (columns 5-6).
One could interpret such result following the reasoning of acquired "lemons", which later evolve to "cherries". However, positive long-term result is weakly significant (10% level, only for logit link function).
In order to reveal underlying differences between cross-border and domestic acquisitions, I further oppose their impacts on performance. Detailed results are reported in Table 9 . Both domestic and
cross-border intakes demonstrate negative short-run effect (see columns 1-2 in Table 9a and Table 9b ).
Incoming inefficiencies of acquired "lemons" are stronger in case of domestic deals. Corresponding effect has greater statistical significance and magnitude. Cross-border buyers further gain in efficiency in one-and two-year terms due to the integration of "cherries" in their production structure.
This doesn't happen in case of same-type domestic merger.
An often-discussed in general literature motivation for sell-off is that some producing entities are under-performing ("lemons for sale"). However, there could be industry-specific reasons. Fist,energy utilities could face overall non-optimality of production capacities' allocation in terms of e.g. proximity to clients or connection to transportation lines. Second, the composition of production "energy mix" could be such that the high share of fossil sources is detrimental to environmental efficiency.
I found that energy producers, which are selling their subsidiaries either domestically or to foreign counter-parties, profit from positive effect over two-year horizon (columns 5-6 in Table 8b ). This could be interpreted such that it takes two years for energy producers to fully re-adjust their production structure. No short run post-merger alterations were found (columns 1-4). The ambiguity of this result could be attributed differences between domestic and cross-border mergers.
I further decompose sell-offs to international and domestic ones. Cross-border sellers immediately profit from the rise in their performance (Table 7a ). Corresponding coefficients are significant at 5% level for specifications with logit link function (column 1) and at 1 % level for probit (column 2). The short-term effect could be explained by selling less efficient entities. However, cross-border merger status is no longer important one and two years later.
Positive short-term post-merger performance outcome is not observed in case of domestic selloffs. Moreover, I revealed negative immediate impact (see columns 1-2 in Table 10a ). Positive effect of selling "lemons" doesn't work while selling subsidiaries to domestic counter-parties. It could be largely mitigated by strengthening of local competitors' market positions, which detriments performance of merging utility. Domestic sellers profit from higher performance at the end of two-year term (columns 5-6). This effect could be explained by successful re-adjustment of structure and location of production capacities, which doesn't happen in case of cross-border sell-offs.
It is worth noting that positive impact of M&As of various types is mostly observed two years after their completion. Such delay could be potentially explained by the time needed to perform internal post-merger adjustments. Utilities need to adapt managerial practices and administrative structure, so that new entity would be fully integrated. Another plausible industry-specific explanation is that certain amount of time is spent to re-shape the energy mix being involved in the production of electricity.
Interpretation of control variables could serve to understanding of energy firms' efficiency. Share of own generation in amounts of energy sold demonstrates positive impact. Indeed, vertical integration influences functioning of power industry. Linear term of CurrentRatio has positive sign, while its quadratic term is negative. Therefore, I revealed inverted U-shape relationship. Performance grows with more available free cash. Energy utilities, which are less financially constrained in short-term, are better able to adapt after the merger. Meanwhile, performance deteriorates if too much cash is extracted from production. At the first stage the output-oriented optimization program is solved for entire 9-year period.
Concluding Remarks
At the second stage DEA performance scores are regressed with GEE population-averaged model, which accounts for their relative nature. I decompose energy deals with respect to their nature (acquisition or sell-off) and international dimension. Obtained categorical dummies are estimated in separate specifications. I control for numerous financial and non-financial intra-firm characteristics, which might affect performance.
Results suggest that biggest European energy producers face immediate post-merger performance losses. In two-years term they benefit from increased performance. However, immediate increase in performance is obtained as the result of selling subsidiaries to foreign counter-parties.
This effect doesn't sustain over long run. The impact of domestic sell-offs is to some extent opposite to the one of cross-border deals. They are detrimental in short run because of post-merger strengthening of competition on local market. However, domestic sell-offs are beneficial in long term due to achievement of more efficient allocation of production capacities.
I showed that acquisitions alter efficiency in a different way. Cross-border and domestic intakes diminish firm-level performance in the short run. This is the result of acquiring under-performing producing entities. International intakes, on the contrary, increase performance in long term. Acquired foreign under-performing "lemons" evolve to "cherries", which significantly contributes to efficiency of parental energy firm.
Potential direction of further research is the investigation of post-merger outcomes for target energy utilities. A sample that would comprise small energy producers should be created for that purpose. 
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